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I. THE PRELUDE
Remember the character Tevye from the production “Fiddler on the Roof”?
One of Tevye’s most famous lines is “Traditions, Traditions (sic). Without our
traditions our lives would be as shaky as . . . as . . . as a fiddler on the roof!”1 This
is the motto the major record labels2 have committed themselves to for decades.
* Pepperdine University School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2011. Brian P. Nestor would like to
sincerely thank: God, Mom, Pops, Brandon, Pepperdine School of Law, Professor Janet Kerr, Professor
Mark Scarberry, Brian Chang, Joshua Krebs, Elizabeth Throne, Christopher Rhyme, Elizabeth Evans,
Brandon Leavitt and the entire JBEL Staff for making this article something I am so proud and blessed
to have authored.
1
IMDB.com, Memorable quotes for Fiddler on the Roof, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0067093/
quotes (last visited Jan. 12, 2011).
2
The four major record labels left in the music industry are EMI (distributor of Capitol and
Virgin); Sony BMG (distributor of Columbia, Epic, J, Jive, and RCA Records); Universal (distributor
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The major record labels unwaveringly committed themselves to the tradition that
profits in the music industry were derived primarily from album sales. This
traditional profit model began with the signing of musical artists to recording
contracts; the artist signed to the major labels would then begin to record music
that could be developed into a full album. 3 Once the album was completed, the
artist and his or her album would be marketed to certain demographics in order to
generate popularity and notoriety for the album.4 Part of that marketing campaign
would be the release of a “single” or individual song from the forthcoming album
to the public.5 The release of a single was to increase the targeted demographics
appetite for the forthcoming album. 6 The marketed album would then be delivered
to retailers who would then sell the album to the consumers in the targeted
demographic.7 This general cycle became the model and the tradition for how
major records labels primarily generated revenue. 8 This traditional profit model
was followed so heavily by the major record labels because it was effective and
successful;9 however, no matter how settled and solidified this profit model
appeared,10 it was still only a tradition.
With respect to traditions, generally, the proven axiom of “if it’s not broke,
don’t fix it” seems to apply. But what happens if the “it” is broken? If a tradition
is no longer serving an effective purpose for its followers, should the followers
continue to keep following such tradition just because it is what they have always
done? Put differently, should one keep going to a well to draw water, even though
that well is empty, simply because that is the well one has always gone to?
Traditions should be followed only as long as they serve an effective purpose.
This concept should not come as a shock because traditions have never been
ineradicable fortresses immune to the forces of change. They are not everlasting
practices. No rule exists stating that traditions must be followed or, more
importantly, that traditions cannot be replaced or adapted with new practices.
Recent monumental changes in the music industry shook the very foundation
of the traditional profit model and have left the major record labels at a pivotal
crossroad.11 The major record labels can choose to follow a tradition that relies on
album releases for profit, a format that is all but doomed in the current market, 12 or
of Universal, Interscope/A&M/Geffen, MCA, Island/Def Jam, Motown); and WEA (distributors of
Warner Bros., Elektra, Atlantic). DONALD S. PASSMAN, ALL YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE MUSIC
BUSINESS 64 (6th ed. 2006).
3
Id. at 61.
4
TAD LATHROP, THE BUSINESS OF MUSIC MARKETING & PROMOTION 10 (2003); PASSMAN,
supra note 2, at 61.
5
Id. at 19.
6
See generally id. at 25.
7
See PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 61. Further marketing may take place after the initial release in
order to maintain a high level of interest for the album. See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 19. An example
of such marketing would be the release of additional singles. See id.
8
See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 3.
9
See generally PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 61.
10
Mark F. Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and The Future of the Music Business, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 685, 689-90 (2009).
11
See id. at 690.
12
See infra Part II.
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they can focus primarily on releasing singles or an individual song in the digital
music marketplace,13 a format and market that has recently flourished with profits
and opportunities.14 This article explains why primarily releasing singles or
individual songs should become the new profit model for major record labels.
Moreover, this article describes how Barry Gordy’s Motown Model provides the
major record labels with the necessary concepts needed to develop a general
strategy for success using this new profit model.
The general causes for the major record labels’ decline in the recent past as
well as the aftermath is discussed in Part II.15 The reasons singles should become
the basis of a new profit model for the major record labels is considered in Part
III.16 How Barry Gordy’s Motown Model is a guide for major record labels in
developing a successful game plan for primarily selling singles is explained in Part
IV.17 The concluding thoughts of the major record labels’ reliance on this singlebased profit model are found in Part V.18
II. HERE LIES THE MAJOR RECORD LABELS
The infamous Napster predicament has been well touted as the funeral for
the record labels that relied on the traditional profit model in the music industry. 19
The file-sharing technology first observed in Napster was an unstoppable force,
which would author an inescapable fate for the record labels still relying on album
releases to turn a profit.20 If Napster was the funeral for the traditional profit
model, the opinion by Judge Robert R. Beezer in that case was the eulogy. 21 Judge
Beezer’s opinion put forth a simple but chilling summary of the problem facing the
music industry: “Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have
to buy.”22 Napster users were able to get free music by “the repeated. . .
exploitat[ion] [of] unauthorized copies. . .[which] sav[ed] the expense of
purchasing authorized copies.”23 Allowing users to obtain music for free damaged

13
For purposes of this paper, the digital music marketplace is defined as places on the Internet,
such as iTunes and Amazon, which allow users to obtain music legally in a digital format.
14
See infra Part III.
15
See infra Part II.
16
See infra Part III.
17
See infra Part IV.
18
See infra Part V.
19
Brian Hiatt & Evan Serpick, The Record Industry’s Decline, ROLLING STONE, Jun. 19, 2007,
http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/2007-06-19_rollingstone_industry_decline.pdf. It is important to note
that the major record labels and Napster tried to negotiate a blanket licensing agreement, where Napster
would agree to become a subscription based service and split the fee with the major record labels in
exchange for the license to the songs. Id. However, the major record labels, despite seeing the
potential of Napster’s popularity among music consumers could not come to an agreement. Id. Some
critics cite the pressure of the major record labels’ artists and retailers badgering the major record labels
to not agree to such terms as the explanation for why no agreement was reached. Id.
20
Tom Zeller Jr., Sharing Culture Likely to Pause but Not Wither, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 28, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/28/technology/28peer.html.
21
A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
22
Id. at 1015 (citing A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 114 F. Supp 2d. 896, 912 (N.D. Cal.
2000)).
23
Id.
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the music market by diminishing CD sales and obstructed the major record labels
from gaining a foothold in the digital music market. 24 Thus, Judge Beezer
commented that the “evidence of lost sales [was] probative of irreparable harm.”25
While the major record labels that sued Napster emerged as the winners from the
case before the Ninth Circuit,26 the major record labels were far from victorious.
Napster opened a musical Pandora’s box as it created the potential for the
emergence of an infinite number of file-sharing sites similar to the Napster site. 27
This allowed for the online theft of music to become an unstoppable force,
devastating the profits of the major record labels who continued to rely on the
traditional profit model.28 Even as online music piracy appeared more and more
irrepressible, the major record labels still elected to fight online piracy head-on.
The major record labels proceeded by continuing to sue the different file-sharing
sites, such as Kazaa, Grokster, or Morpheus on issues of copyright infringement. 29
The plan with these suits was to engage the file-sharing sites in such lengthy and
expensive lawsuits that these sites would find it impossible to mount a successful
defense.30 The lawsuits brought forth under this plan proved successful in ruining
the targeted sites’ profitability.31 Furthermore, when the suits actually made it into
court, they were widely successful as the targeted sites were ordered to shut
down.32 No matter how many file-sharing sites were shut down by financial
warfare or the courts, the one constant has been that file-sharing technology
continues to evolve and thrive, making it a never-ending threat to the major record
labels who live according to the traditional profit model. 33
The raw reality of this threat pushed the major record labels to open a new
front in the war on online piracy: suing their consumers. 34 The major record
labels, along with the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”), filed
over 20,000 lawsuits directed at individuals who illegally downloaded music by
“demanding a settlement payment and threatening a legal battle.”35 From 2003 to
2009, the number of lawsuits against consumers reached an astounding 35,000.36

24

Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1016 (quoting A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 2000 WL 1170106 (N.D. Cal. 2000)).
26
Id. at 1029.
27
Zeller, supra note 20.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See Zeller supra note 20, at 1. Major record label suits have seen appellate courts upholding the
shutting down of file-sharing sites like Grokster and Streamcast. Id.
33
See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 2.
34
See Marc Fisher, Download Uproar: Record Industry Goes After Personal Use, WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/28/AR2007122
800 693.html.
35
Id. One of the more famous cases to emerge out of these lawsuits was the suit brought against
Jammie Thomas. Id. In this federal case, a jury found for the record industry ordering Thomas to pay
$220,000 in damages to the major record companies for the 24 songs she downloaded illegally. Id. The
mathematical breakdown of this remedy is that each of the 24 songs cost Thomas $9,250. Id.
36
See Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., Dec.
19, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122966038836021137.html.
25
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The suits resulted in the major record labels trying to persuade courts to make
rulings that extremely restricted the ability of their consumers to download music
content.37 While suing the participants in the online piracy of music seemed to be
the next logical step, this strategy seemed to do more harm then good.
These suits attracted numerous critics who saw this strategy as a failed
attempt to combat online piracy.38 In holding the strategy as a failure, the critics
agreed that, even with legal proceedings, the file sharing of music over the Internet
had grown consistently.39 The failure of the lawsuits to hinder online piracy
provided clear evidence that negative reinforcement, like legal consequences,
would be found unpersuasive in influencing a majority of consumers to shun
online piracy.40 Rather, many critics agreed that more positive incentives would
have to be used in order to coax consumers into obtaining their music legally. 41
Faced with this bleak realization, the major record labels and the RIAA abandoned
their mass lawsuit strategy in December 2008.42
Allowing users to obtain music for free was not the only problem online
piracy caused for the major record labels. Online piracy gave consumers a taste
for acquiring music by individual song without having to buy those songs as part
of an entire album.43 The ability to purchase songs individually apart from an
album was one that quickly became legal through online retail outlets like the
Apple’s iTunes store.44 Consumers rapidly became infatuated with the notion of
buying songs through such online outlets because it was inexpensive and
convenient.45 This love affair led consumers to collectively turn their backs on
buying albums, which had traditionally been the major record labels’ bread and
butter for profit.46
Unable to effectively combat the theft of music online and timely adapt to
37
See Fisher, supra note 34. The restriction sought by the major record labels stretched to such an
extreme as to prevent the consumer from even making a copy of a legally bought CD onto their
personal computers. Id.
38
See McBride & Smith, supra note 36.
39
Id. Critics also highlighted the reckless manner in which the lawsuits were filed as certain suits
were filed against a thirteen-year old and a person who was already deceased. Id.
40
Id.
41
See id. The authors here were referencing the opinion of Eric Garland, the president of
BigChampagne LLC, a piracy-consulting firm. Id. He stated that the failure of the lawsuits against
consumers proved that “‘it has become abundantly clear that the carrot is far more important than the
stick’” when it comes to combating the online theft of music. Id.
42
Id. Although the major record labels stated they were going to abandon the massive filing of
suits against the consumer, they intended to continue suing those consumers who ignored multiple
warnings to stop illegally downloading music as well as those who illegally downloaded in massive
quantities. Id. The RIAA stated that they felt the lawsuits had been effective in bringing the problems
of online piracy to the forefront and without the lawsuits, piracy would have been worse. Id. Thus, the
major record labels and the RIAA have now incorporated the new strategy of partnering with internet
service providers to combat online piracy. Id.
43
See generally David Blackburn, On-line Piracy and Recorded Music Sales 3 (Dec. 2004),
https:// docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.katallaxi.se/grejer/blackburn/blackburn_fs.pdf.
44
See Mark Harris, iTunes Store History-The History of iTunes Store, ABOUT.COM, available at
http://mp3.about.com/od/history/p/iTunes_History.htm. More about the effect Apple’s iTunes had on
changing the musical taste of consumers is later discussed. See infra Part III B.
45
Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1.
46
See id.

226

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VI:I

consumers’ desires, the major record labels continued to suffer a constant decline
year to year.47 There exists no better example of the economic downturn suffered
by the major record labels than the downturn of album sales since 2000. 48 In 2000,
the total number of albums sold was 785.1 million including both digital albums
and CDs.49 By 2006, this number dropped to 588.2 million albums sold. 50 The
freefall of sales continued in 2007 with only 500.2 million albums sold, which was
equivalent to a 9.5% decrease of sales in just one year. 51 In 2008, the number of
sales dipped well below the 500 million mark as total sales reached a mere 428
million albums sold, which was equal to a 14% decrease from 2007.52 By the third
quarter of 2009 sales had dropped to 368.5 million albums sold, proportionate to a
13.9% decrease from 2008.53 This decline in sales did not play favorites either, as
it affected nearly every genre of music across the music industry. 54 The swift
descent of the major record labels’ profit core has led many within the industry to
pronounce its death.55 Some detractors were so certain the major record labels had
flat-lined that they believed that not even a major hit or superstar act could bring
about their revival.56 This belief was founded upon the idea that no matter how
talented the act, the major record labels did not have a profit model that could turn
them into a sustainable moneymaking venture. 57
The major record labels that relied on the traditional profit model faced a
bleak and uncertain future. But early claims that the major record labels faced
extinction58 may have been an overstatement. The major record labels tried to
remedy their losses by signing musical acts to a specific kind of recording contract
called a “360 deal.”59 “360 deals” are record deals in which the record labels earn
profits from not only their artists’ album sales but also their merchandising and
touring.60 In essence, to supplement the lack of album sales, the major record
labels sign acts to recording contracts that enable them to take profits from

47

Id.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1. From 2000 to 2006 even the top albums witnessed a
decline in sales falling from 60 million to 25 million sold collectively for albums ranked in the top ten.
Id.
51
The Associated Press, U.S. Albums Sales Fell 9.5% in 2007, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/01/04/business/media/04music.html.
52
Ben Sisario, Music Sales Fell in 2008, but Climbed on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/01/arts/music/01indu.html?_r=1.
53
Daniel Kreps, Album Sales Down in 2009 Despite Huge Jackson, Beatles Number, ROLLING
STONE, Oct. 5, 2009, http://www.rollingstone.com/rockdaily/index.php/2009/10/05/album-sales-downin-2009-despite-huge-jackson-beatles-numbers/.
54
Dawn C. Chmielewski, Digital Music Downloads Set Record but Fail to Make Up for Decline
in CD Sales, L.A. TIMES.COM, Jan. 1, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jan/01/business/fi-music1.
55
Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1-2.
56
Id. at 2.
57
Id. at 1.
58
Id.
59
Gil Kaufman & James Montgomery, If the Old Music Business is Dead, What’s Next,
MTV.COM, Dec. 19, 2007, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1576838/20071219/paramore.jhtml.
60
Id.
48
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anything that encompasses their artists’ career.61 But these “360 deals” continued
to incorporate core elements of the failing traditional profit model by requiring the
release of albums into a consistently failing market. 62
Yet, the major record labels seemed dependent on making album sales a
formidable profit model in the digital age. Thus, the marketing of an album began
to be re-envisioned in order to make an album more enticing to buy. One of the
new marketing concepts was the release of albums in the CMX format. 63 The
CMX format incorporates into the purchase of a digital album all related “songs,
videos, images, lyrics, ringtones and other digital [items] into a comprehensive
package . . . .”64 The CMX format is also one that could potentially lead to a
future collaboration between the major record labels and Apple’s iTunes, although
the details over this collaboration are still unsettled. 65 Aside from this
collaboration, Apple’s iTunes offers a similar function within its iTunes Store: the
iTunes LP.66 The iTunes LP offers music consumers the chance to have an
“interactive experience” accompanying each album a consumer buys. 67 This
interactive experience features “lyrics and liner notes” from the album as well as
performance videos, photographs, and bonus materials related to the artist.68
Another idea to reinvigorate consumer interest in buying albums (attempted mostly
by more mature music acts rather than major record labels) has been to create
exclusive release deals with major big box stores like Wal-Mart and Target.69
While these deals provide the chance for better album sales, the artists are not
relying on sales alone to make a profit.70 These deals afford artists a six-figure
paycheck upfront regardless of album sales in the stores. 71 The decision to invest
in these re-envisioned album concepts seems to spell out the clear message that
major record labels are clearly determined to keep fighting the notion that album
sales are no longer the “rainmakers” of the music industry.72

61
Jeff Leeds, The New Deal: Band as Brand, N.Y. TIMES at 1-2, Nov. 11, 2007, available at
http:/www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/arts/music/11leed.html.
62
See id.
63
Eliot Van Buskirk, Apple, Record Labels Diverge Over Next-Generation Full Music Format,
WIRED.COM, Aug. 11, 2009, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/08/apple-record-labels-divergeover-next-generation-full-album-music-format/.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
iTunes LP, http://www.apple.com/itunes/lp-and-extras/.
67
Id. Artists often collaborate on or create the interactive world of iTunes LP that accompany
their albums. Id.
68
Id.
69
Josh Tyrangiel, Prince and Target: A Match Made in Discount Heaven, TIME.COM, Mar. 3,
2009, http://www.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1882697,00.html. Prince and Target signed an
exclusive deal where Target would be the sole retail outlet for Prince’s new three album set. Id. Prince
was not the only musician to have such an exclusive deal: both The Eagles and AC/DC signed such
deals with Wal-Mart, while Bruce Springsteen provided Wal-Mart with the chance to sell an exclusive
greatest hits collection of his music. Id. The benefits to an artist agreeing to these type of deals, besides
the upfront money, are that the stores agree to do major in-store promotions for the albums and give the
physical CDs key shelf placement. Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
See Van Buskirk supra note 63.
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The “360 deals”, the interactive digital albums, and exclusive retail store
deals will certainly provide aid to the major record labels. But these ideas still rest
on the traditional profit model, which has been a consistent failure since 2005. The
major record labels need a long lasting remedy to end their current losses.
Unfortunately, no such remedy has been administered. Yet if the major record
labels seek to develop such a remedy, a good place to start would be with the one
product that has been witnessing unprecedented success despite the downward
spiraling of the music industry. This product is the digital single 73 and the major
record labels should use the digital single as the foundation upon which to build a
new profit model.
III. THE INVASION OF THE SINGLE
A. The Traditional View of Singles
Advocating the sale of the single as the foundation for the major record
labels’ new profit model may strike some as a slightly radical idea. Singles are
considered to have already had “their heyday in the 1950s and ‘60s.”74
Traditionally, physical CD singles delivered very limited profits to the major
record labels and therefore the major record labels barely, if at all, release singles
on physical CDs.75 Most critically, the majority of profits from physical singles
have been perceived to come from the percentage of consumers who resist to
purchasing a full album.76 This perception is so important because the consumers
who resist buying full albums have likely become the majority of music consumers
in the current marketplace.77 It logically follows that if the percentage of
consumers who form the usual market for single purchases has expanded to
become the majority of music consumers, the primary product to offer those
consumers should be singles, not albums. Furthermore, if that large percentage has
begun to purchase most of their music digitally78 then the primary product to offer
would be digital singles. The major labels have not fully embraced this concept,
for reasons difficult to determine. Indeed, digital singles have been recognized by
the major labels as being superior in quality to physical CDs 79 and are anticipated
to replace the whole market for physical CD singles. 80 However, major record

73
A single in the digital market does not necessarily have to be confined to the traditional
definition of a single being the lead or a “hit” song from an album. While many singles in the digital
market do match the traditional definition of a single, the opportunity of the digital market place
allowing consumers to download music on a song-by-song basis means a digital single could be just the
downloading of an individual song.
74
LATHROP, supra note 4, at 36.
75
See PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 86.
76
See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 36.
77
See generally J. Freedom du Lac, Downloads Make Singles a Hit Again, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 8, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/07/AR2006020
702051.html.
78
See IFPI Digital Music Report 2009: Summary, 1 (2009), http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/
DMR2009-summary.pdf.
79
See id. at 3.
80
See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 36.
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labels are still focused on selling albums.81
B. Numbers Don’t Lie
In 2012, digital music sales are predicated to reach revenues of $4.8 billion.82
This amount will likely far surpass the sale of physical CDs, which is projected to
produce only $3.8 million in 2012.83 If digital music sales reach this benchmark it
will likely be due to the surging sales of digital singles.84 Since the year 2000,
digital singles sales have been growing substantially, producing a total of $3.7
billion to date.85 2005 was the first year in which digital single sales truly began
its historic rise in profitable popularity.86 During 2005, the sales of digital singles
totaled about 352.7 million, which was a 150% increase from the previous year. 87
The following year saw an even better return with 582 million digital singles being
bought in 2006.88 In 2007, a record 844.2 million digital singles were sold. 89 And
2008 became a milestone year because the sales of digital singles reached one
billion singles sold,90 finishing the year at 1.1 billion within the United States and
1.4 billion worldwide. 91
The digital single’s lucrative nature has not been entirely lost on the major
record labels. Seeing the potential profits for digital singles sales, the major record
labels negotiated with iTunes in April 2009 to have digital singles and individual
downloads sold on a variable pricing scale.92 The scale sold digital singles at three
different price points: $1.29, $0.99, and $0.69.93 The labels also retained control
over deciding what songs were placed at which price point. 94 In an effort to
maximize revenue, the more recently released, popular songs by the more popular
artists would be priced at $1.29, and the older, less popular songs would be priced
at the two lower price points. 95 However, the new pricing structure and the rising
sales of digital singles have yet to replace the monetary losses of albums sales96

81

See generally supra notes 58-72.
See Mark Hefflinger, Report: Digital Music Download Sales to Pass Sales by 2012, DIGITAL
MEDIA WIRE, Feb. 19, 2008, http://www.dmwmedia.com/news/2008/02/19/report:-digital-musicdownload-sales-pass-cd-sales-2012.
83
See id.
84
See IFPI Digital Music Report 2009: Summary, supra note 78, at 1.
85
See Edna Gundersen, The Decade in Music: Sales Slide, Pirate, Digital Rise, USA TODAY, Dec.
28, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2009-12-29-musicdecade29_CV_N.htm.
86
See Freedom du Lac, supra note 77.
87
See id.
88
See Hiatt & Serpick, supra note 19, at 1.
89
Ken Barnes, Digital Single Tracks Soar in Sales as Albums Drop, USA TODAY, (Jan. 3, 2008,
10:51 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/music/news/2008-01-03-digital-sales_N.htm.
90
Chmielewski, supra note 54.
91
IFPI, supra note 78, at 1.
92
Eliot Van Buskirk, iTunes’ New Pricing Structure Is A Band, WIRED, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.
wired.com/epicenter/2009/04/artists-react-t/
93
Id. Originally, iTunes had every digital single and individual song priced at $0.99. Id.
94
Id.
95
See id.
96
Cf. Gundersen, supra note 85.
82
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that the major record labels seemed determined to try to salvage. 97
A statistical comparison of sales between albums and digital singles neatly
summarizes that albums are a sinking ship when compared to the dominant sales of
digital singles. Even as albums sold digitally continue to show promise, they have
only reached a total of 65.6 million units sold in 2008, far behind the digital
single’s mountainous sales.98 This dominance can best be exemplified by the hiphop artist Flo Rida’s young career. Flo Rida’s first single, “Low,” from his first
album, “Mail on Sunday,” was the biggest selling digital single of the decade with
5.2 million downloads.99 Despite the champion success of “Low,” “Mail on
Sunday” sold only 381,000 copies total.100 Flo Rida followed by releasing a
second album, “R.O.O.T.S.,” and the first single was “Right Round,” which
attained 2.4 million downloads in just a four-month span.101 Even with such a
hugely successful single in tow, “R.O.O.T.S.” sold less then 100 thousand copies
the first week it was released.102 Flo Rida’s current career sales are ten million
singles sold compared to 500 thousand albums. 103 If the old adage of “numbers
don’t lie” is correct then the aforementioned overall singles sales and the Flo Rida
example strongly supports that the major record labels’ focus should be on selling
digital singles not albums. Yet, sales are not the only evidence to endorse such a
proposal.
C. An Apple A Day: The iTunes Factor
The proposition to sell digital singles turns also on the changing taste of
music consumers, who favor the benefits offered by the digital music market. 104
The digital music market is connected to multiple devices and services. 105 These
devices and services provide consumers with a plentiful selection of music that is
easily accessible and portable.106 Essentially, the digital music market has
provided consumers “maximum choice in the way music can be purchased and
enjoyed.”107 The choice presented by the digital music market has given rise to its
stunning growth and popularity amongst consumers for downloading music over
buying it at traditional retail outlets. 108 And no digital music provider has been
97

See Van Buskirk, supra note 63.
Billboard/Soundscan: Digital Album Sales Up 32% In 2008, NielsenWire, Jan. 7, 2009, http://
blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/billboard-soundscan-digital-album-sales-up-32-in-2008/.
99
Gundersen, supra note 85.
100
Paul Grein, Chart Watch: Week Ending April 5, 2009: A Prince Beats A King (Of Pop) Yahoo!
Music, April 8, 2009, http://new.music.yahoo.com/blogs/chart_watch/32895/week-ending-april-5-2009a-prince-beats-a-king-of-pop/.
101
Todd Martens, Competing CD Sales Strategies on Display, L.A. TIMES, April 9, 2009, http://
articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/09/business/fi-cotown-music9.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
See Gundersen, supra note 85.
105
See ROBERT LIND ET AL., ENTERTAINMENT LAW: LEGAL CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES
§2.30 (3d ed. 2009).
106
See Gundersen, supra note 85.
107
LATHROP, supra note 4, at 123.
108
See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 14-42 (2d ed.
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able to capitalize on the consumer’s thirst for choice more than Apple.109
Apple realized early during the emergence of the digital music market that
consumers craved having maximum choice, accessibility and portability for their
music.110 Apple successfully satisfied all of these cravings with the iPod and the
iTunes Store, which instantly became a match made in music fan heaven. 111 Both
introductions revolutionized the way music could be experienced and consumed. 112
The iPod enabled music fans to carry an entire music catalog in a single handheld
device, while the iTunes Store allowed consumers to buy digital songs individually
without having to buy the whole album. 113 Therefore, a purchase that would
normally cost from $9.99 or $18.00 could be reduced to $2.00 to $3.00 because the
consumer could buy only the 2 or 3 songs he or she actually desired rather then the
whole album.114 Furthermore, “cherry-pick[ing]”115 of single songs from albums
is an ability that the iTunes Store fosters with its formats, applications, and design.
The homepage of the iTunes Store features three different lists of the top
selling music on the site.116 The first list to appear on the homepage is entitled
“Top Charts-Single” and consists of the ten top digital singles currently sold on the
site.117 Users can place their cursor over a single on this list and purchase the song
without ever coming in contact with the single’s accompanying album. Users can
also toggle between viewing the top-selling digital single and the top ten music
videos being sold in the same list. 118 However, the list of the top ten albums sold
on iTunes can only be seen after one scrolls down past the first two lists. 119
Furthermore, the “New and Noteworthy” section provides digital singles equal
billing and placement alongside the newly-advertised digital albums.120
Once an artist, single, or album is selected by a user, a dual list on the left
side of the page shows the top digital singles purchased from the artist’s catalog, as
well as the top digital albums that are available from that artist. 121 “Top Songs” is
the preset view for the list, rather than “Top Albums.”122 For the more established
musical artists, those who have an extensive catalog of music, the iTunes Store
will often compile an essential mix of a particular artist’s catalog of music.123

2009).
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See Gundersen, supra note 85.
See id.
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Id.
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Delta & Matsuura, supra note 108.
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Gundersen, supra note 85.
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Id.
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Id.
116
ITUNES STORE, http://itunes.apple.com/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). The analysis of the iTunes
Store format and design in this article uses the 9.0.2 version of the iTunes Store.
117
Id.
118
Id. A music video can be considered a digital single just in the audio-visual format.
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See id.
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See id. The “New and Noteworthy” section appears on the homepage of the iTunes Store but
also on the homepage for each genre of music. Id.
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Id.
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ITUNES, supra note 116.
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See id.
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These mixes, called “ iTunes Essentials,” are compilations of all the singles or
individual songs that were either most popular or most significant during the
artist’s career.124 These singles are not organized by album but are arranged
according to song type. 125 Moreover, anytime an artist’s catalog is displayed, such
as in a general search of the artist’s name, each song is given a popularity ranking
dependent upon the number of consumers purchases for that song. 126 Albums, in
contrast, do not receive any popularity ranking. 127 Essentially, these lists allow
customers to become familiar with an artist through his singles, without any
deference paid to the artist’s albums.
Accordingly, even a cursory glance at the format and design of Apple’s
iTunes Store shows a trend of developing consumer preferences for digital singles
over albums. The manner in which the iTunes Store presents digital singles is
significant because the iTunes Store is often thought of as “the biggest game in
town when it comes to digital music sales.”128
D. The Other Avenues
More recently singles have been used in a variety of ways across multiple
commercial avenues such as television, video games, ring tones, and advertising
campaigns.
1. Singles On Television
Traditionally, television has been a powerful venue in which music, almost
always in the forms of singles, has been showcased.129 The reason this avenue has
been so useful is that it allows audiences to experience, both audibly and visually,
artists and their singles.130 Specifically, late night talk shows through live
performances, and MTV through the use of videos, have been the premiere venues
for artists and their singles to gain exposure on television. 131 Recently, however,
singles have prospered much more. 132
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See id.
Id. The songs are broken down into three categories: “The Basics,” “The Next Step,” and
“Deep Cuts.” Finally, the entire collection is offered as “The Complete Set.” See id.
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Id.
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See id.
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Van Buskirk, supra note 63.
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See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 183, 185.
130
See id. at 183.
131
See id. at 184. Late night talk show performances and MTV videos can directly impact sales,
but the exposure and promotion among millions of viewers has been “an important indirect impact on
solidifying and increasing sales.” Id. Notably, since they are sold by iTunes, music videos have
recently become a direct source of profit for the artists. ITUNES, supra note 116.
132
The traditional television formats likely only provide a limited opportunity for singles to gain
exposure. Late night talk shows are insufficient because they only provide an artist and his single a
one-time performance segment, rather than a commercial that runs numerous times on different
channels. However, since late night talk shows provide exposure and promotion to millions of viewers,
they should still be utilized for the promotion of singles. See LATHROP, supra note 4, at 184-85. Since
music videos are the visual equivalent of a single, this medium is a premiere format to promote a single
on television. MTV was the pioneer and leader in this field, but as of late, it has struggled to create
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Singles have become an integral part of numerous television commercials.
The television commercials for the 2009 NBA postseason incorporated the slogan
“Where Amazing Happens.”133 The use of this tag line led the NBA to seek out
hip-hop artist Kanye West to play his single “So Amazing” as the commercial’s
soundtrack and the theme song for the entire NBA playoffs. 134 Thus, West’s song
had the opportunity to be exposed to the many millions of people who tuned in to
the record-breaking135 NBA playoffs over a period of forty-three games.136
Singles are being used in television not only to promote events like the NBA
playoffs, but also to promote the release of products. Another hip-hop artist, T.I.,
collaborated with General Motors Corp. (“GM”) to promote the release of GM’s
new Chevrolet’s Impala SS.137 The promotion had three different commercials set
to music of T.I.’s single “Top Back (Remix),” featuring numerous odes to
Chevrolet’s Impala SS.138 Two of the three commercials featured a mixture of
T.I.’s own music video for the single and new footage of T.I. racing the promoted
car with NASCAR driver, Dale Earnhart Jr.139 This one single provided T.I. with a
multi-million dollar contract, exposure for the single, multiple videos used to
further promote the single, and publicity to the NASCAR market.140 Hip-Hop
stars are not the only artists who prospered in this avenue. R&B artist, Beyonce
Knowles collaborated with DirectTV by altering the video for her single “Upgrade
U” to feature her encouraging consumers to “upgrade” to DirectTV’s cable
services.
These examples illustrate that singles are not being used as mere musical
backdrops in television. As a result, singles are allowing artists and their music to
receiving prominent exposure, attention, and popularity. And the greater exposure,
attention, and popularity a single receives, the more likely it will thrive in sales. 141
Beyond TV shows, singles have turned the television into further success with
successful programs centered on music. Chris Harris, MTV Loses Another Music Show, Fails to Renew
“Alexa Chung”, IMUSICALL.COM, Dec. 11, 2009, http://imusicall.com/1287/download-music-mp3/mtvloses-another-music-show-fails-to-renew-%e2%80%9calexa-chung%e2%80%9d/.
133
Shaheem Reid, Kanye West’s “Amazing” Helps Kick Off NBA Playoffs, MTV.COM, Apr. 15,
2009, http://www.mtv.com/news/articles/1609290/20090415/west_kanye.jhtml.
134
Id.
135
Mike Reynolds, TNT ESPN Close 2009 NBA Playoff with Record Rating, Multichannel News
(June 3, 2009), http://www.multichannel.com/article/277997-TNT_ESPN_Close_2009_NBA_Playoffs_
With_Record_Ratings.php. ESPN and TNT both witnessed record-breaking ratings of viewership for
the 2009 NBA playoffs. Id.
136
TNT Scores with Most Watch NBA Playoffs in Turner’s 25-Year History of Televising the NBA,
TIMEWARNER (June 1, 2009), http://www.timewarner.com/corp/newsroom/pr/0,20812,1902140,00.
html.
137
T.I. Races to the Top with Chevrolet’s Impala SS, NEW BLAZE (May 1, 2007), http://newsblaze.
com/story/2007050115244100002.mwir/topstory.html.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. T.I.’s exposure to the NASCAR market is significant because that market is often seen as an
untapped or even unreachable market for Hip-Hop artists. Raygan Swan, NASCAR Looking To Expand
Into The Hip-Hop Lifestyle, NASCAR.COM, July 23, 2007, http://www.nascar.com/2007/news/headlines/
cup/07/23/nascar.hiphop/index.html.
141
See PASSMAN, supra note 2, at 234. Regardless of the effect on sales, these televised
commercials may have to use singles in such a conspicuous manner as will likely lead to a higher price
in licensing fees for the artist. Id.
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their incorporation into video games.
2. Singles In Video Games
Video games have been licensing songs to be used as a backdrop to the
actual gameplay, similar to a soundtrack in a film. Video game giant, Electronic
Arts (“EA”), has incorporated full music soundtracks into its franchise sports
titles.142 Titles like “Madden NFL 10” feature select singles from musical acts
2Pac, Nirvana, Kid Rock, and Iron Maiden.143 Moreover, EA has a function on its
website that allows gamers to buy the digital singles from the game’s
soundtrack.144 While this function provides the single mass exposure, as well as
another place to be purchased, the singles on these soundtracks are confined to the
background of the games.145 The sport, not the single, is the primary focus. 146
However, singles within video games have recently broken free from the
background, thanks to games like “Guitar Hero” and “Rock Band” making singles
the primary focus of the games.147 These games have had tremendous success
with sales, equaling more than $2.3 billion in just a three-year span.148 Along with
great monetary success, these games have also generated prevalent interest in
musical acts and their singles both past and present. 149 This phenomenon is due in
part to the extensive catalog of singles the games provide as choices for the
gamer.150 The surging interest and success for single in videogames has artists
even considering these games to be a significant outlet for future singles. 151
Moreover, incorporating these new singles into the games is convenient because
gamers can buy the digital singles from the games’ online websites.152 Overall, the
digital single downloaded for the games have come to realize an “iTunes-like
popularity.”153
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EA, EA Trax Game Music (Jul. 31, 2009), http://www.ea.com/uk/music/the-official-maddennfl-10-soundtrack. Some of the other EA sports titles to include a licensed soundtrack are the NHL,
NBA Live, Fight Night, and Need for Speed collections. Id.
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Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Jeff Howe, Why the Music Industry Hates “Guitar Hero”, WIRED, (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.
wired.com/culture/culturereviews/magazine/17-03/st_essay. The major record labels have shown little
profits, as the license fees for the singles are very cheap. Id. Despite the low cost of the license fees,
this marketing avenue for singles should still continued to be used and explored by the major record
labels because of the vast popularity of games like Madden, which has sold over 65 million copies and
lasted over two decades. John Madden Retires from NBC’s Sunday Night Football, CNBC.COM, (Apr.
16, 2009), http://www.cnbc.com/id/30246302.
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Howe, supra note 147.
149
Id.
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GuitarHero.com, Guitar Hero Music Catalog, http://hub.guitarhero.com/music-catalog; see also
Rockband.com, The Music, http://www.rockband.com/music.
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Id.
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Daniel Kreps, Have “Guitar Hero” and “Rock Band” Peaked?, ROLLING STONE, Dec. 12,
2008, http://easymusicguides/page/335/.
153
Id. The iTunes popularity attained by single downloads for music games can be exemplified
with the rock group, Motely Crue. Motely Crue released its single “Saints of Los Angeles” for
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Musical acts like Aerosmith154 and the Beatles155 have also benefited from
these games. They have generated renewed enthusiasm for their past catalogs by
having an entire exclusive edition of the games dedicated solely to their music. 156
The publisher of “Guitar Hero,” Activision, also released “DJ Hero” in order to
capture a different consumer demographic who purchase hip-hop, techno, and
house music.157 The profitable impact of these two Activision game collections
was so impressive it prompted Universal Music Group to buy the Activision
company.158 The above video games analysis provides clear evidence that digital
singles are the more exposed and bankable format in the current market.
3. Singles On Cellular Phones & PDA Devices
Singles have created additional revenue stream through their invasion of
mobile devices like ring tones or ringbacks on cellular phones and PDA devices.
Ring tones are digital singles that are heard in place of the ring on a consumer’s
cell phone.159 The sales statistics for this revenue stream witnessed a sharp fall of
24% from 2007 to 2008,160 but ring tones in 2008 still grossed a sizable sum of
$541 million.161 Ringbacks are digital singles a caller hears played from the phone
of the person being called while waiting for the call to be answered and, as of
2009, total sales have reached $235 million. 162 Accordingly, digital singles have
turned a medium of personal human communication into profit for the major
record labels.
4. Singles In Campaigns
Some artists are using their singles to create campaigns for themselves
backed by large corporate entities. Hip-hop artist Young Jeezy serves as a premier
illustration of this undertaking. Young Jeezy partnered with Belvedere Vodka to
launch a nation-wide campaign entitled “America Reborn” promoting Young

download on Rock Band before even distributing it on traditional music formats. Mike Smith, Guitar
Hero: Aerosmith outsells Aerosmith Album, YAHOO! GAMES, July, 29, 2008, http://videogames.yahoo.
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Rock Band downloadable single proceeded to outsell iTunes and Amazon downloads five to one. Id.
154
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Jeezy’s musical endeavors simultaneously with the alcoholic beverage. 163 This
campaign featured Belvedere Vodka as a sponsor for Young Jeezy’s national tour
with an entire website created dedicated to this campaign. 164 The website was
titled “jeezycirculate” named after Young Jeezy’s song, “Circulate,” from his
current album, “The Recession.”165 The website also housed a promotional music
video for “Circulate,” which doubled as a commercial for Belvedere’s Vodka.166
Thus, a single, especially one that was not one of the primary promotional singles
for “The Recession,” became the bedrock of a national advertising campaign and
sponsorship. Belvedere continued this trend by enlisting hip-hop artist/producer,
RZA, to create a downloadable theme song and video for its campaign, “Luxury
Reborn.”167 The theme song single and video were also discussed extensively
during interviews with RZA about being apart of Belvedere’s “Luxury Reborn”
campaign.168 The foregoing examples reveal that singles, even ones not intended
to be “hit” singles, can be and are being used as centerpieces in national
advertising campaigns.
E. The Singular Truth
Singles have proven their continued dominance in the sales of digital music,
reflecting the changing taste of consumers. They have also gained a significant
foothold across vast business avenues. Albums have not had this impact and are
likely not capable of doing so. Accordingly, the musical market has become
centered on the sales of singles. Releasing albums into such a musical market
makes album releases akin to salmon swimming upstream. Similar to the salmon,
a few albums will make it successfully, but many albums will be consumed by the
bear market standing savagely in the middle of the stream of commerce. The shift
from albums to singles as a primary profit generator of major record labels is not
just an interesting idea, but likely an absolute necessity for survival.
IV. THE RETURN TO HITSVILLE U.S.A.
The shift from albums to singles would without any doubt be viewed as a
very significant and an extremely difficult change for the major record labels.
Such an adjustment would have a rippling effect reaching nearly every department,
artist, function, and schedule connected with the major record labels. 169 All those
involved then, including the executives implementing this new directive, would
likely develop numerous fears and questions. Fears and questions lead to
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It is important to recognize the tremendous effects such a shift would have on the operations of
the major record labels. However, a detailed analysis of such effects would be far too extensive for the
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uncertainty and uncertainty is a key ingredient for chaos. The major record labels
accepting that such a shift to selling singles needs to be made, must determine how
to prevent the potential mayhem that could result. One way to avoid the looming
chaos would be to have a general strategy for how this new model would
successfully operate. A general game-plan would provide a foundation upon
which the finer details for success can be properly articulated. In short, the major
record labels need a vision of success.
When creating a vision for a new profit model so diametrically opposed to
the current one used, the best idea is to look for an already successful example of
that model to use as a template. Fortunately, for the major record labels, there
exists an example of a record label that reached outstanding success based
primarily on selling singles: Barry Gordy’s Motown. At the outset, it should be
recognized that the model of Barry Gordy’s Motown label (the “Motown model”)
is not offered as a completely comprehensive strategy, or to answer every concern
for how the major record labels can survive by selling singles. Rather, the Motown
model is being presented here because it can provide the major record labels with
feasible suggestions, valuable insights and most importantly, a general vision for
what is needed to succeed in the singles-dominated market. The following is an
analysis of the Motown model and the concepts that can be learned to help the
major record labels develop their general game plan for success using a singlebased profit model.
A. The Motown Model
The Motown model is famous for being “a hit factory” of successful
singles.170 Motown mastered the production of hit singles because of founder
Barry Gordy’s vision for his record label to operate like a factory. 171 The factory
idea came from Gordy’s days of working at the Lincoln-Mercury automobile
plant.172 Gordy took notice that automobiles were nothing but a metal frame in
their infancy but after those frames traveled along the plant’s assembly line, the
frames became pristine automobiles. 173 This experience helped him to envision
each artist like an automobile at the Lincoln-Mercury plant.174 Gordy believed that
if he created a musical assembly line at Motown he could take anyone with the
slightest frame of ability and turn that person into a superstar. 175 Gordy’s
“assembly line” operated on three different principles: family-like closeness,
fruitful competition, and constant collaboration. 176 These three cogs would give
life to Gordy’s vision of Motown becoming “Hitsville U.S.A.”177
170
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also the name of the first Motown studios and offices. Id.
172

238

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. VI:I

B. The Concepts
1. Create Family-like Closeness
Berry Gordy attributed Motown’s ability to churn out so many successful
singles to the “atmosphere” surrounding the company. 178 Motown’s atmosphere
fostered an environment of experimental creativity and the elimination of the fear
of making a mistake.179 Every idea and goal was considered attainable. 180 There
was no exception to this rule as every artist, idea, and song was pushed to reach its
“full potential.”181 This atmosphere of fearless creativity promoted unity and pride
among every Motown member, making everyone involved feel as though they
were family.182
Every member of the Motown label, whether on the creative or business side,
was sternly encouraged to be openly honest about each song considered for
release.183 This honesty was to ensure that Motown continued to produce music
that showed growth and improvement with each release. 184 Hence, when Motown
charted a single, everyone in the company felt like they were a part of its success.
Under this process, Motown’s strength and morale grew internally and externally
at the same rate.185 This honesty was made possible due to Gordy’s belief in the
ability of his talent pool as a collective unit. 186 The people in his creative talent
pool were assured that even if they, individually, failed to produce a hit, Gordy
would continue to work with each one of them until they all found success. 187
Therefore, no one had to be concerned about bringing forth an idea they did not
feel positive about or be afraid of losing their job because their idea was not a
hit.188 Essentially, Gordy ensured productive teamwork by developing a
comfortable, creative atmosphere where each record was not judged, but rather
subjected to a family decision.
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song written by Smokey Robinson. Id.
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2. Create Fruitful Competition
Motown’s family-like closeness established a strong foundation upon which
Gordy could cultivate fruitful competition. By 1963, Gordy communicated to his
employees that “garbage” record would be “eliminated quickly” from being
considered for release.189 Gordy’s standard of what constituted garbage was any
record that did not have the potential to be in the Top 40.190 Gordy followed with
the announcement that if someone produced a hit for a particular artist, that person
would get the first opportunity to produce the next hit for that artist before anyone
else.191 The competitive spirit among the talent inside the Motown studios and
offices spilled over into the live performances.
All of the Motown acts performed together on the same bill, which Gordy
promoted as “The Motown Revue.”192 Gordy promised “the feature star spot” of
each showcase to whoever generated the most applause during his or her
performance.193 The competition for the feature star spot had each performer
fervently trying to top the previous performance. 194
Later, Gordy would take the concept of Battle of the Bands and apply it to
the Motown Model.195 On certain nights, Gordy would pit two of his artists
against each other in a musical boxing match. 196 The first artist would come on
stage and perform a song.197 Then, the second artist would come on stage and
perform a song.198 This would continue for multiple rounds working the crowd
into a bigger and bigger frenzy with each song performed. 199 While these
processes became a type of musical Darwinism, the artists involved believed that
performing in this structure would make all of them victorious in the
marketplace.200 These formats, combined with the large amount of hits created
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Marvin Gaye was pitted against a very young Stevie Wonder. Id. at173-174. The crowd turned on
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the intention, Gordy abandoned the idea completely. Id.
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between these competing artists, made the artists successful as both the revues and
the battles produced sold-out performances.201 These competition expectations
amused the Motown talent pool and created highly motivated but still friendly
competitors.202 By fostering this competitive edge among all of the Motown
artists, writers, and producers, Gordy inspired the talent pool to want to produce hit
after hit.203
3. Create Constant Collaboration
The closeness and competitive drive of Motown’s talent flourished into
constant collaboration within the entire talent pool. The constant collaboration
developed from Gordy’s original management philosophy that he would build the
label’s structure around the people in the talent pool and not force an artist into a
particular formation.204
To ensure limitless collaboration, Gordy enlisted
musicians from “the seediest of bars and hangouts” to form Motown’s incredible
in-house band.205 Musicians from these underground locations provided essential
grooves and various feels upon which the Motown sound was founded.206
Therefore, the in-house band was not one-dimensional and Gordy could change the
sound of the music to fit the style of any artist. 207 Gordy’s vision for limitless
collaboration spilled over into the structure of the entire label. Every specific
element of what made an artist successful was broken down into a separate
station.208 Gordy acted as the collaborative glue between each station, and made
sure that the overall vision for each artist was achieved. 209 Moreover, each station
communicated constantly with each other to form a cohesively intricate strategy of
success.210 Thus, every artist that came from Motown was a product built with a
plan to be nothing less than a star with multiple hits. The real catalyst for the
constant collaborations was that every station and person involved with Motown
was literally working in the same place at the same time. 211 This was possible as
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Hitsville consisted of a couple of combined row houses in Detroit, Michigan. 212
The constant collaborations housed in the Motown Model truly embodied the
musical assembly line that Barry Gordy had originally envisioned.
C. The Overall Vision
Summarily, the environment fostered by the Motown model funneled every
label employee’s abilities and goals into a single belief that, as a team, they would
create a label that could not miss when it came to achieving success with singles.
This environment was the very core of the Motown model and therefore, the major
record labels should focus on building a similar environment within the singlebased profit model. The idea of creating such an environment may seem less then
concrete because it is cemented in intangibles like faith, confidence, support, and
growth. Yet, these intangibles allowed Motown to succeed in produce numerous
and tangible superstars. Thus, these intangibles were Motown’s tradition and
should become the building blocks of the new tradition of major record labels
using a single-based profit model.
V. THE CODA
Logically, if a business does not survive it cannot succeed. A business
should constantly be incorporating the strongest survival methods to ensure its
success. The major record labels are not exempted from being subject to this
simple business logic. Therefore, the major record labels must be willing to
incorporate the strongest survival methods available regardless if those methods
are radically different or against their traditional procedure.
The traditional profit model based on albums sales continues to fall steeply
even within the current the digital realm. 213 Yet, the sales, uses and popularity of
singles are enormously successful in comparison those of albums. 214 And the
blueprint of a successful single-based profit model exists within Barry Gordy’s
Motown Model.215 It is time for the major record labels to let go of methods that
do not ensure their survival. It is time for the major record labels to push off from
traditions that no longer ensure their success. It is time for the major record labels
to embrace a new and stronger tradition. It is time for the major record labels to
notice: Albums are dead – sell singles.
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